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transformation. Areas which had hitherto been on the far margins of the market economy 
became an integral part thereof as the Cape economy as a whole was engulfed by the global 
economy. The Cape economy, however, developed a very strong dependence on the 
powerful British imperial economy. As  a producer of primary products it was dependent on 
the fluctuations and vacillations of the British market. 
Economic development fed a rapid process of modernization which facilitated the economic 
integration of the Cape. It involved the development and improvement of transport and 
communication systems, the spread of elaborate financial and commercial systems, and a 
dramatic growth of urban centres. The combined effect of these developments considerably 
shortened the distance between regions, between centre and periphery and between 
producers and markets. The physical and economic landscape of the Cape changed 
dramatically during the nineteenth century. 
Economic development and modernization precipitated a process of socio-economic 
differentiation which changed the social profile of the Afrikaner society. The group of 
market-oriented Afiikaner farmers, or gentry, which had been largely limited to the Western 
Cape, expanded considerably, both numerically and spatially. The process of rural 
accumulation was accompanied by a concomitant process of rural dispossession which 
gave rise to the marked increase in the number of bywoners (squatters) and poor white 
Afrikaners. Afrikaners were also increasingly attracted to the urban centres as  
businessmen, artisans, professionals and labourers. 
It is pertinent to our investigation that the processes of economic development and social 
change occurred in a British colonial setting, under the aegis of a colonial government. In 
addition, the English settlers who established themselves mostly in the urban centres were 
important agents of change. They provided vital links in the chain of economic 
development stretching from London to the smallest dorp. They also brought with them the 
Victorian ethos of progress and presented a model of a modern urban society which radiated 
beyond the urban boundaries. 
The process of change in Afrikaner society was also fed by the cultural im gact Of Anglicization which gained momentum in the last third of the century. Increasing n mbers 
of Afrikaners familiarized themselves with the English language and English culture more 
broadly. The social impact of this cultural transformation was manifested in an explosion 
of associational life for the promotion of common interests. 
Thus, as Afrikaners were increasingly integrated into the expanding British economy, they 
were also socialized into British culture and way of life. All this occurred within the 
framework of an alien colonial state. In understanding the process of socialization among 
the Cape Afrikaners it should be borne in mind that they were never totally alienated from 
the colonial state. Their participation in the institutions of the colonial state was at first 
marginal and peripheral. However, they gradually increased and expanded their 
participation from the local to central institutions. The granting of Responsible 
Government in 1872 was a crucial milestone in their socialization into the colonial state. 
The balance of socialization of the Cape Afrikaners into the colonial economy, society and 
state was mixed. As there were periods of economic boom, so there were periods of bust. As 
some economic sectors flourished, so others declined. As there was a minority which was 
fully assimilated into English culture, so there were very many who were not. In the public 
political sphere there was also a combination of integration and alienation. For our 
investigation it is important to emphasize two crucial characteristics of this balance. 
Firstly, the process of integration and socialization of the Cape Afrikaners occurred in 
conditions of symbiosis with and dependency on not only the British colonial state but also 
the English-speaking sector of the colonial population. Secondly, the balance improved 
considerably, from an Afrikaner perspective, in the last third of the century. 
The contradictory nature of their socialization had a definite impact on the Cape Afrikaners' 
ideological and political orientation. In dealing with this aspect one has to focus on the 
Afrikaner Bond which was, from 1883, the sole political agent of the Cape Afrikaners as 
members of an ethnic community. In dealing with this aspect of the evolution of the Cape 
Afrikaners' political behaviour we have to tackle the Afrikaner nationalists' historiography, 
and in this case the work of F. A. van Jaarsveld. van Jaarsveld's basic argument is that the 
dormant Afrikaner nation was woken to its national destiny by imperialist intervention in 
the affairs of the independent Boer republics and particularly the annexation of the 
Transvaal and the ensuing first war of liberation. Even Giliomee, a critic of this 
interpretation, sees the beginning of Afrikaner nationalism in the Cape in the Afrikaner 
Bond in the late nineteenth century. 
In order to focus on the ideological and political orientation of the Bond we must rid 
ourselves of two inherent assumptions of the nationalist historiography: firstly, that there 
was vertical congruity between the more mature Afrikaner nationalism which fathered the 
apartheid system and the "Afrikaner nationalism" of the late nineteenth century; and, 
secondly, that there is a horizontal congruity between the development of Afrikaner political 
consciousness in the Cape and the Republics. The existential experience of the respective 
Afrikaner communities was totally different. 
Thus, in order to understand Afrikaner politics in the Cape, as manifested in the Bond, we 
must focus on the Cape in the late nineteenth century. Two analytical distinctions may 
facilitate the uncovering of the true nature of political consciousness of the Cape Afrikaners 
in that period. Firstly, there is a distinction between ethno-cultural nationalism and 
ethno-cultural mobilization. Both rest on an effective ethno-cultural consciousness and 
solidarity. The difference between these two manifestations of ethno-cultural 
consciousness is that ethno-cultural nationalism seeks to fulfil itself through national 
self-determination and national exclusiveness, whereas ethno-cultural mobilizers accept 
the ethno-cultural pluralism of the state and use the ethnic group as a base in the struggle 
for a share in its power and resources. Secondly, there is a distinction between ethnic core 
and ethnic diaspora. From the vantage point of the Cape Afrikaners, their brothers in the 
republics represented an ethnic diaspora. Their political consciousness and behaviour were 
primarily shaped by their existential experience at  the Cape. 
On the basis of these distinctions I would argue that the Afrikaner Bond was a 
manifestation of ethnic mobilization rather than ethnic nationalism. Furthermore, an 
appropriate analysis of the interaction between the ethnic core and the ethnic diaspora 
reveals that, in fact, in the wake of the Transvaal crisis of the late 1870s and early 1880s, 
ethnic mobilization rather than pan-Afrikaner nationalism flourished in the Cape. The 
Bond failed the two basic tests of ethnic nationalism. Firstly, it did not seek to achieve 
ethnic self-determination through disengagement from the British Empire. The Bond, in 
fact, gave expression to the basic satisfaction of the Cape Afrikaners with their colonial 
existence. It also expressed a genuine loyalty to crown and empire. Indeed, the decade and 
a half following the Transvaal crisis witnessed the peak of Afrikaner satisfaction with and 
loyalty to the Empire. This loyalty was not simply a manifestation of sentimental 
attachment to Queen Victoria. It stemmed from an articulated feeling that British rule was 
both beneficial and benevolent. Consequently, the ideal of the Bond was to exploit the 
privileges and liberties under British rule rather than to fulfil their destiny through the 
agency of republicanism. Secondly, the Bond did not strive for ethnic exclusiveness. There 
were not even hidden thoughts of ethnic cleansing, or even exclusion. They eulogized 
about the benefits of having Africans as actual or potential providers of labour. And the 
English settlers were perceived not as enemies but rather as actual or potential allies in the 
task of ensuring that the black man would carry the "white man's burden". Thus, the 
Bond's definition of the Afrikaner was voluntary rather than ethnically ascribed. The 
ethnic group was a means rather than an ideal. The ideal was the amalgamation of 
English-speaking and Dutch-speaking Afrikaners into one white South African nation. If 
there were not more unity between the two segments of the white population in the Cape, it 
was not for lack of willingness on the part of the Afrikaners. 
How can we account for this moderate, compliant response of the Cape Afrikaner in the 
very decade in which pan-Afrikaner nationalism was supposed to have been born or 
awakened. During the height of the Transvaal crisis, even the moderate and pragmatic 
Hofmeyr proclaimed that "blood was thicker than water". Yet, by the end of the decade, 
colonial water, rather than ethnic blood, was flowing in the political veins of the Afrikaner 
Bond. 
In accounting for this we must remember that by the end of the period of Dutch rule the 
collective self-consciousness of the Cape white population was grossly undeveloped, if it 
existed at all. Indeed, their collective self-consciousness was a product of their encounter 
with the impact of British imperialism and capitalism. It evolved as part of the process of 
their socialization into the colonial, imperial world. Thus, the colonial reality, with its 
negative, but also positive, aspects, made a definite imprint on their collective personality. 
Their particular emotional attachment to Queen Victoria could be construed, from this 
perspective, as a collective search for a mother figure. Thus, rejection of British rule and 
heritage, was not necessarily a natural response to their colonial bondage. Furthermore, a 
deep sense of weakness constituted an integral part of their formative experience. They 
existed, in their perception, on the verge of survival. The swart gevaar was not an 
invention of the National Party during the 1948 election campaign. It was also uppermost 
in the consciousness of nineteenth century Cape Afrikaners. They believed that they could 
survive only through dominating the "Natives". However, they were too weak to secure 
domination on their own. When they encountered the Xhosa on the eastern frontier under 
Dutch rule they were forced to survive through conflict and CO-existence. With the advent 
of British rule and British arms, the possibility presented itself for a dominating symbiosis, 
namely symbiosis with the British in order to dominate the blacks. Thus, the attachment to 
crown and empire and the desire to amalgamate with the English settlers made definite 
strategic sense. 
However, in order to account fully for this strategic perception, we have to focus on the 
social basis of the Afrikaner Bond which gave rise to it. The Bond had its following only 
among certain sectors of the Afrikaner society. It had virtually no support among the 
anglicized Afrikaners, who had no interest in ethnic mobilization. It also had a very small 
following among the Dutch Reform Church clergymen. It was thus isolated from most of the 
educated Afrikaner elite. In other similar cases, members of the educated elite played a 
crucial role in leading radical ethno-nationalist movements; they were to play such a role 
among Afrikaners in the twentieth century. The Bond also had no support among the 
growing number of dispossessed Afrikaners, bywoners and poor whites. These were at that 
time more concerned with individual than collective ethnic survival. In the twentieth 
century, the politicized, dispossessed Afrikaners provided the troops for the mobilizers of an 
exclusive, chauvinistic and racist Afrikaner nationalism. The backbone of the Afrikaner 
Bond was what may be termed as the Afrikaner social centre, the group which has also been 
labelled as the Afrikaner gentry. These were land-owning farmers who were closely linked 
to the market economy. This backbone of Cape Afrikaner society did not represent a 
homogeneous socio-economic group - there were marked differences in wealth; there were 
also regional differences and those stemmihg fiom the types of cultivation. They shared in 
common an interest in using the state to protect and promote the agricultural sector. 
This group was extremely conservative, and unlikely to be attracted by fancy ideas or 
radical politics. In rejecting, in 188 1, accusations of disloyalty the committee of the GraafT 
Reinet branch of the Bond stated: "Therefore we candidly make use of this opportunity, to 
throw such an indignant accusation far away from us ... for most of us are landed 
proprietors, and it a well-known fact that landed proprietors are conservatives." Such a 
group might have turned to anti-colonial radicalism if the status quo had been clearly 
inimical to their survival or to their vital interests. This, however, was certainly not the 
case during the 1880s. The existential balance of the Afrikaner farmers was more favourable 
than before. Their main ethnic grievance, the status of the Dutch language, was being 
rectified and the Afrikaner Bond, representing their interest, enjoyed such success that very 
soon it became the power broker of Cape politics. If the Bond did not form the government 
within a year after its amalgamation in 1883 it was only because it preferred to be the "king 
maker" rather than the king. It is this group of conservative Cape Afrikaners which 
responded to the crises of their ethnic diaspora in the late 1870s and mid-1880s 
(Bechualand crisis). These crises definitely agitated Cape Afrikaners and sharpened their 
ethnic identity and consciousness. However, the balance between colonial experience and 
the call of pan-Afrikaner solidarity boosted colonial ethnicity rather than pan-Afrikaner 
nationalism. Thus, the overwhelming rejection by the Bond of S .  J. du Toit's more ethnic, 
integral conception of Afrikaner nationalism and the acceptance of conservative and 
pragmatic Hofmeyr as the unchallenged leader of the Bond were congruent with the 
existential experience and vital interests of its social base. 
The contradictory impact of the pan-Afrikaner crises went further, also shaping the nature 
of Cape Afrikaner ethnic consciousness. Indirectly, through their contribution to ethnic 
mobilization which brought about domestic success, they also contributed to the dilution of 
their ethnic consciousness. Essentially, the ethnic consciousness of the Cape Afrikaners, 
as manifested in the Bond, which was informed by a definite ethno-cultural identity, but 
also by a mixture of ethnic grievances and trans-ethnic interdependence, was marked by 
ambivalence. This ambivalence was reflected in the very meaning of the term "Afrikaner", 
which conveyed, interchangeably, ethnic as well as trans-ethnic identity. While the Bond 
appealed to ethnic identity and experience in the process of political mobilization, it also 
celebrated its de-ethnicization through the incorporation of English speakers in its ranks. 
While language, the innermost core of ethnic identity, was a major grievance, the goal was 
equality with English rather than supremacy of Dutch. The ultimate political 
manifestation of this ambivalence was that the goal of ethnic mobilization was not the 
fulfiient of an ethnic destiny but rather the creation of conditions which would obviate 
the need for it. As D. C. de Waal told the 1887 Bond congress: ". . . where is the Bond going? 
It is moving towards the time when there will be here neither Dutch nor English and all will 
be Afrikaners." This ambivalence was also reflected in the attitude of the Bond towards their 
republican brothers. While the Bond definitely showed solidarity towards them, Theron, its 
secretary, spoke with equanimity in parliament in 1888 on the possibility of the Transvaal's 
becoming an English republic. Finally, this ambivalence informed the Bond's political goal - 
neither ethnic exclusiveness and domination nor disengagement from the British empire. 
Indeed, the Bond was essentially a truly white, non-ethnic, Home-Rule party. 
This was the Afrikaner historical field in which Rhodes sought to sow the seed of Cape 
collaborative imperialism. The success of his endeavour was not simply a testimony to his 
manipulative powers and scheming. In the Bond he found willing collaborators. The 
question, indeed, is why the Bond came forward. It had already supported two Englishmen 
as prime ministers - Upington and Sprigg. The support of the latter was, in a way, much 
more natural. Both Upington and Sprigg were, like the Bond leaders, essentially parish 
pumpers. The crucial question is why did they dump Sprigg, the compliant parish pumper, 
in favour of Rhodes the imperial visionary? Why did they allow him to use their political 
space a s  a launching pad for his grand imperial design? Why did they give him almost 
unlimited trust and credit? And, finally, why did the give him their love? 
The explanation that Rhodes secured Bond support through the liberal distribution of 
shares, farms and other presents does not hold much water. These benefits represent the 
lubricant, not the engine, which drove the Bond into Rhodes's arms. What, then, 
motivated the Bond? Firstly, Rhodes was more prepared than his predecessors to identify 
fully with and promote the material interests of Afrikaner farmers. Furthermore, towards 
the end of the 1880s the Zuid Afrikaan began to articulate the need for a new class alliance 
between the farmers and the mining capitalists. Both were land-owning classes sharing an 
interest in the steady flow of cheap black labour. Rhodes was portrayed as  a "national 
bourgeois" in contradistinction to those who repatriated their profits. Rhodes was also the 
only prominent English politician who supported the Bond in its "native" policy, not only 
regarding labour but also on the crucial issue of the franchise. He also supported the "strop 
Bill" which caused the rift between him and Olive Schreiner. In sum, the Bondsmen viewed 
Rhodes not as  an imperialist but rather as a genuine colonialist. His expressed views as  to 
the role of the empire in South Africa were identical to theirs - minimal interference in 
domestic South African affairs, imperial coastal defence and an imperial common market 
based on colonial preference. In this respect Rhodesia was viewed by Bondsmen as  a 
promised land, a wonderful combination between Utopia and Eldorado - abundance of land 
for their young generation, plenty of gold, an open market for their produce, an appropriate 
"native" policy and no say for English liberals and humanitarians. Ironic as it may sound, 
Rhodes was viewed by Bondsmen as a bulwark against imperialism. They also regarded him 
as a bridge between them and Kruger at a time when the relations between the Cape 
Afrikaners and their Transvaal brothers were strained. 
Indeed, Rhodes presented himself to the Bondsmen as  the epitome of the ideal Englishman 
with whom they wanted to amalgamate into a new South African nation. There was, 
however, an additional dimension to the way the Afrikaners related to Rhodes, which gave 
the relations amazing warmth and depth. In their encounter with the English-speaking 
settlers, the Afrikaners suffered from a "rejected lover syndrome". They were deeply hurt by 
the arrogant, patronizing and contemptuous attitude of many prominent Englishmen 
towards them. Rhodes, however, was different. He was the most prominent Englishman in 
South Africa and perhaps the most celebrated imperial statesman of the time. Yet, he not 
only identified with their interests and prejudices but also opened up to them. In his 
attitude towards them there was no shred of arrogance or contempt. On the contrary, he 
was open and warm. He visited them on their farms and extended to them the finest 
hospitality. He showed admiration for their Cape heritage and to their sterling qualities. 
This earned him the nickname "the young burgher" among his English friends . Among the 
Afrikaners he was better known as de Engelsman met de  Afrikaner hart (the Englishman 
with the Afrikaner heart). This deep, intimate quality in the attitude of the Afrikaners 
towards Rhodes was sensitively captured by a brilliant young Afrikaner. Shortly after the 
Jameson Raid, Jan Smuts wrote: "It will never be known there [England] to what an  
astonishing extent Mr Rhodes had in six or seven years become the national idol of the 
Dutch Afrikanders. I, who had an opportunity to watch the growth of this profound 
devotion, could find nothing comparable to it in the sphere of political relationships except 
the beautiful, truly religious attachment of liberals of the old school to Mr Gladstone." 
For the Bondsmen the transition from Sprigg to Rhodes was a transition from the politics of 
the possible to the politics of the desirable. He embodied for them the ideal empire and the 
ideal Englishman with whom they wished to identify and amalgamate. Rhodes was for 
them not merely a political ally but an admired and beloved leader. 
However, in order to understand fully the shift of the "parish-pump" Bond to an alliance 
with Rhodes the "Colossus", we have to examine the position of the external forces of 
gravitation operating on both. Rhodes was attracted by the call of empire but pinned his 
hopes on a Cape sub-imperialism. He had no problem cultivating this imperial strategy 
because this was also Britain's preference. Rhodes was attracted to the north partly by an 
imperial vision which transcended his immediate arena. However, at least part of the 
urgency of his approach to northern expansion was linked to the shift in the focus of 
economic power from the Cape to the Transvaal which resulted from the discovery of gold 
on the Rand in 1886. The parochial Bond was also engulfed by this great movement of 
economic forces. In joining Rhodes they were, thus, swimming with the economic stream. 
However, the economic stream northwards was leading not only along the Missionary Road 
to Rhodesia; it was flowing even more forcefully into the Transvaal, the land of their ethnic 
brothers. However, the Transvaal, through various economic means, blocked, or severely 
limited, the access of Cape products to its expanding markets. Had Kruger been more 
responsive to the supplications of the Bond, the latter would have certainly chosen the 
Transvaal route, not only for sentimental, ethnic reasons. Kruger, in fact, pushed the Bond 
to the alternative of Cape British sub-imperialism and straight into the arms of Rhodes, the 
young, charming, promising and insistent suitor. 
And so, in 1890 the contradictions finally converged. The marriage which lasted for some 
five years was a happy one. The love and admiration of the Afrikaners for Rhodes far 
exceeded those of the courting period. But, even at the height of Rhodes's standing among 
the Afrikaners, the alliance had definite boundaries which were delineated by Afrikaner 
ethnic taboo. Referring to the possibility of a confrontation between Rhodes and the 
Transvaal, the Zuid Afrikaan, in October 1893, was blunt: "But one thing is clear - if such a 
conflict will occur all the state of affairs in South Africa will change and the Cape Afrikaners 
will treat Rhodes in a totally different manner." Rhodes must have been either extremely 
desperate or extremely foolish when he got involved with the conspiracy which climaxed in 
the Jameson Raid. The resulting divorce was a painful one. It was not a clean, instant 
break. It lasted for more than two years and left deep scars on the Bond and Afrikaner 
society. It should be stressed, however, that it was a divorce from Rhodes personally rather 
than from crown and empire. Nor did it eliminate their desire to forge a white South-African 
nation out of the English and Dutch. Afrikanerdom in the Cape was definitely not an 
exclusive laager by the end of the nineteenth century. 
